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Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Rights of Way, Abatement and
Criminal Damage
Case Note: Chamberlain v Lindon (1981) All ER 538
Graeme Broadbent and Jean Cross
Disputes between neighbours have become part of the regular
fare ofpopular culture, whether on television or in the newspapers. It is
not difficult to understand why this should be: the extraordinary
behaviour of neighbours acting in unbiblical fashion toward each other
excites prurient and voyeuristic tendencies which such programmes and
articles can exploit to attract an audience. In these dramas of everyday
life, the law has more than a mere walk-on part. Ward LJ captures the
point succinctly: 'disputes between neighbours tend always to compel ...
some unreasonable and extravagant display of unneighbourly behaviour
which profits no one but the lawyers'. I The law does not provide a
single, simple mechanism for resolving such disputes. One possibility is
to try to settle the matter by employing a self-help remedy. However,
using such remedies carries considerable risks. The courts do not like
them,' they are confrontational, and the dangers of acting outside ,their
parameters are ever present. Further, as Chamberlain v Lindon3
illustrates, use of such remedies does not necessarily mean that a
dispute is resolved without recourse to lawyers and legal proceedings.
But what this case also demonstrates is that opportunities for the
preferable course of dispute avoidance are not always taken and that a
Alan Wibberley Building Ltd v Insley [1998] 2 All ER 82 p 83. This case concerned a
boundary dispute, and was itself the subject of popular interest: see, for example, the
Daily Mail, 6 October 1998. It should, in fairness, be pointed out that Ward LJ
regarded that particular dispute as an exception to the general run of neighbour disputes
to which he alludes in the remarks quoted in the text.
See, for example, Lagan NaVigation Company v Lambeg Bleaching, Dyeing and
Finishing Co Ltd. [1927] AC 226 pp 244-5 per Lord Atkinson and Southwark LBC v
Williams [1971] Ch 734 pp 745-6 per Edmund Davies LJ.
[1998] 2 All ER 538, Division Court, Queen's Bench Division, Rose LJ and Sullivan
J.
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consequence of a failure to anticipate and address problems before they
arise can be a protracted and unseemly dispute.
C owned two adjacent properties, Mill Farmhouse and the Mill.
He agreed to sell the Mill to L in 1988. In order to obtain access to the
Mill from the highway, it was necessary to cross a piece of land ('the
brown land') which C had retained as part of Mill Farmhouse, and L did
this both on foot and by vehicle in order to reach his land. In 1991,
following proceedings for specific performance, C granted L, by deed, a
right of way over the brown land, and L continued to cross it to gain
access to his property. However, L had taken to crossing the brown
land diagonally, to which C objected. It would appear that the deed did
not limit the use of the right ofway and, of course, in the absence of any
restriction L could cross the brown land in whichever way and by
whatever means he chose: It is, therefore, difficult to understand on
what basis C wished to prevent L crossing it diagonally. If C wished to
proscribe a particular way of crossing the land, he should have done so
at the outset, or, at the latest, in the deed of 1991. Having failed to do
so, C could not subsequently limit L's use of the right of way. In 1995,
following correspondence between the parties, C laid the foundations of
a wall, which he was building in order to prevent L from driving
diagonally across the brown land. L drove his car over the foundations
and parked it on his property. C completed building the wall, with the
result that L's car was trapped. L then complained that he had been
denied his right of access across the brown land, as he had the right to
cross it in whatever direction he chose. He also complained that the
width ofhis right ofway had been reduced by the wall. L could, at this
point, have pursued a civil action through the courts. Instead, he gave
notice that he would demolish the wall unless C did so. C failed to do
this, and so, in April 1996, L knocked it down.
C then had a choice: he could accept L's actions; try to reach an
agreement or compromise with L; pursue a civil action; or institute
Where a right of way is the subject of an express grant, its precise scope falls to be
construed with reference to the tenos of the grant considered in the light of the
surrounding circumstances at the date of the grant': Kevin Gray Elements of Land Law
(2"d edn 1993)p 1081. See Cannon v Villars [1878] 8 Ch 0415 esp p 420 per Sir
George Jessel MR; St Edmondsbury and Ipswich Dioceasan Board of Finance v Clark
(n 1)[1975] 2 WLR 468 esp pp 476-7 per Sir John Pennycuick.
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criminal proceedings. He chose the last of these, 'a manifestly
inappropriate procedure to adopt in the circumstances'/ and preferred
an information against L alleging criminal damage contrary to s I (1)
Criminal Damage Act 1971.6 The magistrates dismissed the information
on the basis of s 5 (2) (b), which, so far as is material, provides:
'...(2) A person charged with an offence to which this section
applies shall, whether or not he would be treated for the purpose
of this Act as having a lawful excuse apart from this subsection,
be treated for those purposes as having a lawful excuse ... (b) if
he destroyed or damaged ... the property in question ... in order to
protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or
interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested
in himself ... and at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute
the offence he believed - (i) that the property, right or interest was
in immediate need of protection; and (ii) that the means of
protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or would be
reasonable having regard to all ofthe circumstances.'
They found that L had destroyed the wall in order to protect a
right or interest in property' which he believed to be vested in him,
namely the right to cross the piece of land diagonally. They found that
he honestly believed that this right or interest was in immediate need of
protection and that the means adopted were reasonable in the
circumstances. The criteria in s 5(2) (b) were made out, and L had a
complete answer to the charge. C appealed by way of case stated,
contending, inter alia, that L's purpose in destroying the wall was not
the protection of property but the avoidance of litigation, and that the
right was not in immediate need of protection as the wall had stood for
[1998] 2 All ER p 540 per Sullivan J.
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to
another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to
whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an
offence.!
S 5(4) extends the definition of property to include ' any right or privilege in or over
land, whether created by grant, licence or otherwise '.
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nine months. For reasons discussed below, the Divisional Court
dismissed the appeal, holding that the justices were entitled to dismiss
the information.
An initial issue8 relates to the interpretation of s 5(2) (b). In order
to have a defence under section 5(2) (b), the defendant must have
caused the damage 'in order to protect property'. Although the words of
s 5(2) (b) might appear, in the context of the subsection, to be wholly
subjective, in a series of cases9 the courts have imported objective
criteria, particularly with regard to the words 'in order to protect
property' and 'in immediate need of protection'. That this is at variance
with the wording of the subsection has been the main thrust of academic
criticism ofthis approach. 1O However, as Professor Smith points out/'S
5 is couched in very subjective terms, and a literal interpretation of it
would involve a departure from the general principle that standards are
set by the law and not by the defendant. Although the courts'
interpretation does not accord with the words of the subsection, this may
provide a reason for construing it in this way. But such an interpretation
has set up a tension, discussed below, which neither earlier cases nor
Chamberlain v Lindon resolves.
The higher courts have held that a two stage test is involved. '2
The first stage, which is subjective, is to ascertain the defendant's
purpose. The second stage is for the court to determine whether that
purpose amounted to something done in order to protect property: if it
did not, then S 5 cannot apply.' 3
Aside, of course, from the evidential question of whether the court believes the
defendant.
See, for example, R v Hill, R v Hall (1988) 89 Cr App R 74; Blake v DPP [1993]
Crim LR 587; Johnson v DPP [1994] Crim LR 673.
10
11
12
IJ
See, for example, Smith JC, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, (9" edn 1999), pp 688-
690 and commentary on Johnson v DPP [1994] Crim LR p 674; R Card, Card, Cross
and Jones Criminal Law (14'h edn 1998) p 365; Allen M, Textbook on Criminal Law.
(4" edn 1997), p 438.
op cit (1999) pp 689-9.
See the cases cited supra n 9.
As a matter of precedent, the Divisional Court in Chamberlain v Lindon was bound to
follow the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Hill.
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The first thing to ascertain was, therefore, L's purpose in
demolishing the wall. This in tum depended on whether he honestly
believed that he was entitled to use the right of way as he did. It did not
matter whether he was in fact correct or not. Section 5 does not require
that his belief is reasonable or that it is based on an objectively accurate
assessment of his position in the civil law: the reasonableness or
otherwise of his belief is merely evidential, as a factor to be taken into
account in deciding whether he honestly held the belief.14 Thus, in
Chamberlain the civil law issue did not require detailed consideration,
as the focus was on the defendant's belief about the legal position of the
parties rather than the actual state of affairs. 15
C argued that L's real purpose in demolishing the wall was not the
protection of property, but was instead the avoidance of litigation. The
court took the view that, on the evidence, his purpose was to protect his
right of way and the fact that, at first, his preferred method of doing so
was abatement rather than civil proceedings did not convert his purpose
into the avoidance of litigation. L was thus not prevented from relying
on s 5(2) (b) on this ground. In this, the court's wider characterisation of
L's purpose was critical. On this view, the avoidance of litigation, or
indeed the desire to exercise the remedy of abatement, merely became
a means ofachieving this end ratherthan a purpose in itself.'6
Another aspect of the subsection was more troublesome. Section
5(2) (b) (i) requires that the defendant must believe that the right was in
immediate need of protection. As we have seen, as interpreted by the
courts, this contains both a subjective and an objective element. This
creates a tension relating to the question of how the court views a
14
15
16
S 5(3) provides: 'For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether a belief is
justified or not if it is honestly held'.
Even if the defendant is mistaken as to his position in the civil law, he can still rely on
s 5 as long as the tribunal of fact accepts that he believed he was entitled to act in the
way he did: see Smith JC, op cit, supra n 10 (1999) p 692.
How extensively criminal courts need to explore civil law concepts in order to
determine questions of criminal responsibility is an issue of more general application.
This remains a contentious issue which is particularly significant in relation to offences
against property. See generally Smith JC, 'Civil Law Concepts in the Criminal Law'
(1972 B) CLl 197.
Professor Smith, op cit, supra n 10 (1999) P 689, interprets the avoidance of litigation
as an alternative purpose.
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defence under s 5(2) (b) bearing in mind the words of the subsection
and the interpretation of them by the higher courts. In particular, there
is the question of who decides whether the defendant has satisfied all
the requirements of the defence. Commenting on this, Professor Smith
says:17
'There is, however, justification for the importation of an objective
element into the question of D's alleged belief that the property
was "in immediate need of protection". Under s 5(2) (b) (i) and
(ii) it is irrelevant that the beliefwas wholly unreasonable if it was,
or may have been, actually held. Unreasonableness is only
evidence, relevant to the ultimate question whether the belief was
held or not. But, once D's belief is ascertained, the question
whether it. is a belief of the kind specified in the section is an
objective question - a question of law or, perhaps, mixed fact and
law. Whether the need, as seen by D, is an "immediate" need is a
question for the court or jury. If, for example, Johnson had said
that he believed his goods would be in need of protection when he
moved them into the premises in a week's time, the court may
believe him but not accept that this belief is a belief in an
"immediate" need for protection. It may be that all three
decisions l8 can be justified without resort to the unacceptable view
that "in order to" bears an objective meaning, because the need,
even as asserted by the defendants, was not an immediate need.'
In Chamberlain v Lindon, the need, as asserted by the defendant
and accepted by the court, was demonstrably immediate, and the
purpose the protection ofhis right of way: it was therefore the converse
of the earlier cases, and did not require the court to resolve the
subjective/objective dilemma.
It was suggested that the fact that nine months had elapsed since
the wall was built was fatal to L's defence, as he could not honestly
believe that the action was necessary for the immediate protection of
17
18
op cit p 690.
The cases cited supra n 9.
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his right. During those nine months, there had been correspondence
between the parties, and Sullivan J took the view that L should not be
penalised for his attempt to resolve the dispute by such means. He
continued:
'So long as the wall remained it was, on the facts as believed by
the respondent, and obstruction to his right of way and so there
was an immediate need to remove it.'19
The case was thus, in the court's view, distinguishable on the facts
from cases such as Hi/po where the threat lay in the future. In the
instant case, there was evidence that D believed that the interest was
presently in immediate need of protection, and there was evidence to
support this belief. Although a literal reading of the subsection might
suggest a connotation of urgency in the use of the 'immediate', it is
suggested that the approach of the Divisional Court has much to
commend it in encouraging, or at least not penalising, attempts to deal
with the situation by means other than by causing immediate damage to,
or destruction of, property. It is surely not desirable to produce a
situation where D is, in effect, required to act at the first opportunity by
committing acts which cause damage, and hence, perhaps, exacerbate
the situation, if there is the possibility of resolving the matter by less
dramatic means. What is not clear, however, is how far this latitude
extends. Speculation of this matter was not necessary to decide this
particular case, but may have to be confronted in the future on different
facts. It might be tied in to some evidence of attempts by D to resolve
the matter by means other than damaging property. But what of the
situation where D simply does nothing for a period of time and then acts
causing damage? On the view expressed by Sullivan J, the immediacy
still exists as long as the interference with property is ongoing, for he
does not qualifY the statement quoted above by reference to any action
on D's part by way of attempting to resolve the dispute by methods not
involving direct action. The approach of the Divisional Court, in not
19
20
[1998] 2 All ER at p 546.
(1988) 89 Cr App R 74.
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requiring that the defendant act at the first appearance of the
interference in order to have a defence under s 5, but allowing him the
possibility of a defence where he acts at the first available opportunity is,
for this reason, to be welcomed. It is suggested, however, that the
statement should be confmed to the facts of, or similar to, the present
case, where there is evidence of an attempt to resolve the matter by
other means, for otherwise there is a danger of the dispute drifting on in
a state of uncertainty, with an ever present threat of escalation through
direct action. If the defendant is at least doing something to resolve the
dispute, the fact of the interference is still to the fore and may be said to
satisfy Sullivan 1's view of immediacy. Where there has been no
attempt to resolve the situation, it might be harder to demonstrate
continuing immediacy, in the sense described here: indeed, a prolonged
failure to do anything might be seen as acquiescence aM undermine the
defendant's ability to argue that his proprietary rights are being
interfered with and are in immediate need of protection." Ultimately,
each case will tum on its facts.
As to the fmal element, s 5(2) (b) (ii), Sullivan J observed" that
the question was not whether the means of protection adopted by L
were objectively reasonable but whether L believed them to be so, and
by virtue of s 5(3) it was immaterial whether his belief was justified
provided it was honestly held. On the facts found by the magistrates, L
honestly believed that the means used were reasonable in all the
circumstances.
The court did not, of course, have to determine the issue as to
whether L'S self-help would have been justified as a matter of civil law,
for, as we have seen, this was not necessary for resolution of these
criminal proceedings. In the light of this, the lengthy discussion of the
abatement by the Divisional Court seems disproportionate, even if out of
deference to counsel's argument which seems to have been designed to
assimilate the requirements of the civil law with those of s 5, and which,
"
"
As counsel pointed out. the longer the wall remained the more urgent the need. from
L's point of view, to remove it to avoid any suggestion of acquiescence: [1998] 2 All
ER at p 544.
[1998] 2 All ER P 546.
- 62-
Mountbatten Journal ofLegal Studies
if successful, would have been to the detriment of the defendant.
Section 5 does not replicate the civil law requirements for abatement,
which have, in recent years, been subject to judicial refmement.23 Most
obviously, the civil law requires consideration of what the position was
in fact rather than what D believed it to be. Further, the requirement of
immediacy, while relevant to both, is qualified in the civil law to eliminate
the possibility of self-help where a remedy by ordinary legal process,
however protracted, is available, except in circumstances which are
clear-cut and urgent or where the matter is so trivial that legal
proceedings would be inappropriate, none of which applied here.24
There is no such restriction in s 5, and the Divisional Court recognised
that action may still be immediate even though not taken at once: in
effect, the Divisional Court only requires that, for the purposes of s 5,
action is taken at the earliest opportunity rather than literally at the first
appearance of the interference with the proprietary right. Given the
differences between the requirements of the civil and criminal law, C
may have been more successful if he had proceeded by way of a civil
action.
The criminal courts are not the obvious forum for the resolution of
disputes over matters ofcivil law, whatever other ends they might serve.
The conclusion of criminal proceedings in Chamberlain v Lindon
cannot be said to have solved the problem that lay at the heart of this
dispute, namely the use of the right of way:" a detailed exploration of
the position of the parties in the civil law was not necessary to determine
the question of criminal responsibility. The escalation of this quarrel
and the various means employed by the protagonists to deal with it -
including self-help and the initiation of criminal proceedings - highlight
the absence of a suitable ADR mechanism for resolving neighbour
disputes of this kind. But, in the end, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that, with more thought at the outset about the right of way, and drafting
23
24
2S
See, for example, Burton v Winters [1993] 1 WLR 1077.
This can be traced back as far as Blackstone: see Burton v Winters, supra n 23, p 1081
per Lloyd LJ. See generally on abatement Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (17 th eOO
1995), pp 1549-1553 and R A Buckley The Law ofNuisance, (2"" edn (996), ch 9.
And indeed other issues, such as whether C was entitled to compensation for the
destruction of the wall, which he had built at a cost of£I,800: [1998] 2 All ER p 54!.
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the deed in relation to it, this whole protracted and, in many ways, sorry
episode could have been avoided.
Graeme Broadbent
Senior Lecturer in Law
University of Sunderland
and
Jean Cross
Solicitor
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